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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a theory of inflation in commodity money and supports it by evidence 
from inflationary episodes in France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The 
paper shows that commodity money can be inflated similarly to fiat money through 
repeated debasements, which act like devaluations. Furthermore, as with fiat money, 
demand for commodity money falls with inflation. Unlike fiat money, at high rates of 
inflation demand for commodity money becomes insensitive to inflation, since 
commodity money has intrinsic value in addition to its transactions value. Finally, we 
show that an anticipated stabilization reduces demand for commodity money, which is 
opposite to the effect of anticipated standard stabilization on demand for fiat money. 
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Commodity Money Inflation: 
Theory and Evidence from France in 1350-1436 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes and analyzes inflation in an economy with commodity money. The 
results are derived from a simple model of commodity money and are supported by 
historical data on money and prices in Medieval France, in the years 1350-1436. We 
show that there is much similarity between inflation of commodity money and that of fiat 
money. First, commodity money can be inflated by debasing the currency and inflation 
can be quite high. Second, the demand for commodity money falls as inflation rises. We 
also find two dissimilarities between the two types of money. The first is that due to the 
intrinsic value of commodity money, the demand for it becomes insensitive to inflation 
when the rate of inflation is high. The second dissimilarity is that under commodity 
money the demand for money falls with anticipation for stabilization, while it increases 
under fiat money.1 
 The paper first shows how repeated debasements lead to inflation, which can be 
rather high. In each new debasement the ruler issues a new coin with a lower content of 
the precious commodity, which is silver in our historical example. When the new coin 
enters into circulation, the quantity of money increases and prices rise. The ruler gains 
from such debasement since he collects seignorage from coins minted and reminted. The 
main intuition behind this result is basically Gresham’s Law. The new coin, which has 
                                                 
1 Some fiat money inflations and stabilizations were accompanied by issuance of new fiat notes, thus 
resembling more our commodity money model, but these cases were rare. 
 1 
less silver content, drives out some of the older coins, which contain much more silver. 
Agents gain from reminting the old coins despite the loss of seignorage. An implicit 
assumption here is that coins circulated by tale rather than by weight. This assumption 
was recently questioned in Rolnick, Velde and Weber (1996), but we find that it is 
strongly supported by our empirical results. 
 The paper then analyzes demand for commodity money. Inflation erodes the value 
of money and operates as a tax on money holdings. Hence, if the public expects higher 
inflation the demand for money is reduced. But losses to holders of commodity money 
are a bounded function of the inflation rate, due to the alternative use of commodity 
money, which can be used to create new coins by reminting. Furthermore, when inflation 
is sufficiently high, so that all coins are reminted, the demand for commodity money 
becomes insensitive to the rate of inflation. The first main result of the paper is therefore 
that demand for money is negatively related to inflation, but at high rates of inflation it 
becomes insensitive to it. 
 Next the paper discusses the effect of anticipated stabilization. Note that under 
fiat money anticipation of stabilization reduces future expected costs of holding money 
and therefore increases the demand for money. Under commodity money stabilization 
requires issuing new coins with higher content of silver, since the process of inflation has 
previously reduced the silver content of coins to very low levels. This is indeed how 
many inflationary episodes ended during the historical period we examine. Hence, in 
stabilization old coins become either completely useless or go through silver extraction, 
which is quite costly. Hence, stabilization is costly for money holders, and anticipation of 
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such stabilization reduces the demand for money rather than increases it. This is the 
second main result of the paper. 
The empirical part of the paper examines these two predictions of the model. 
Although we do not have direct observations on the demand for money in medieval 
France, we do have data on minting volumes by the royal mints and our model enables us 
to relate the two variables. Our empirical analysis indeed shows that the negative effect 
of the rate of inflation on the demand for money is strong at low rates of inflation and 
disappears at high rates of inflation. We also find support to the other result of the paper, 
that anticipation of stabilization reduces the demand for money. We estimate the 
probability of stabilization under rational learning and show that this probability has a 
negative effect on the demand for money. It is important to note that this finding also 
supplies some evidence for rational Bayesian learning, which is interesting as well. 
 This paper, therefore, extends the existing literature on commodity money and 
connects it to the mainstream literature on money and inflation. Recent important 
contributions to the theory of commodity money are Li (1995), Sargent and Smith 
(1997), and Velde, Weber and Wright (1997). While these papers develop the basic 
theory of commodity money and of a one-time debasement, our paper offers three 
important additions to this literature. First, it extends the analysis to a situation of 
repeated debasements, namely of inflation, which to our best knowledge has never been 
done before. Second, it derives testable quantitative predictions on the demand for money 
during inflation. That leads to our third contribution to the literature, namely an empirical 
analysis of minting during inflation, which supports the main results of our model.2 On 
                                                 
2 Extending the analysis to issues of inflation comes at the cost of simplification. Instead of using search or 
cash-in-advance models as the above papers, we use a simpler model with money in the utility function.  
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the historical side our paper is related to various historical accounts of debasements. It is 
most closely related to Sussman (1993), which describes the same historical episode, but 
also to other studies of debasement, mostly in early periods of modern Europe.3 
 The paper is organized as follows. It begins with historical background in Section 
2. Sections 3-6 provide the theory of commodity money inflation, where Section 3 
outlines the model, section 4 analyses minting and prices, Section 5 presents inflation 
dynamics, and Section 6 studies the effect of expected stabilization. Section 7 describes 
the data and Section 8 presents the empirical analysis. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Historical background 
During the French economic and commercial expansion of the thirteenth century, there 
was a growing demand for a common medium of exchange to facilitate commercial 
transactions. That development coincided with rulers’ efforts to reaffirm their sovereignty 
by controlling the currency and raising seignorage revenues. They achieved these 
objectives by establishing a system of mints, which charged seignorage for coining 
private bullion into royal coins. By the end of the thirteenth century these mints were 
gradually replacing private mints. 
 The royal mint system expanded throughout the fourteenth century and by 1415 
there were 24 mints operating in France, requiring a relatively sophisticated mechanism 
of monitoring mint masters. It involved incentives, like paying mint masters some 
percentage of the coins struck, direct supervision by royal officials, and also inspection in 
Paris of random samples of coins sent from mints. As a further reflection of the influence 
                                                 
3  See Bordo  (1986) for a survey, Gould (1970) for the Tudor debasement, Kindleberger (1991) for 
debasements during the 30 years war; Miskimin (1984) for France; Motomura (1994) for Spain and Pamuk 
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and control of the central Parisian administration, the regional mint accounts were written 
in the French of the court, whereas all other local fiscal accounts were written in Latin or 
local dialects. This relatively well-organized and well-monitored mint system gave the 
crown an instrument capable of effectively carrying out its monetary policy. 
 Mints combined pure silver with base alloys to produce an alloy of a given 
fineness (percentage of silver) and then cut it into coins. The coins’ face value was not 
stamped on them but rather assigned by the crown. The prevailing accounting system in 
France was the tournois system, based on the denier tournois, the penny of Tours. In this 
system twelve deniers equaled one sou, and twenty sous made up one livre. The livre 
tournois was used as a numeraire by which all commodities, silver and gold included, 
were valued. Royal mints produced three types of coins: 1) full bodied gold coins of 
denominations greater than one livre, 2) silver coins of fifteen, ten (the most popular), 
five and three deniers, 3) petty coins, containing less silver, of two, one and half denier. 
 The objectives of medieval monetary authorities were similar to those of their 
modern successors. In ordinary times the monetary authority was concerned with 
responding to fluctuations in market prices of precious metals and with problems arising 
from wear and tear of coins in circulation. It also addressed other concerns such as 
monitoring mints, combating counterfeit and maintaining the quality of royal coins 
through legislative and enforcement measures. 
 In periods of fiscal crisis the crown had an additional objective, namely to raise 
inflation tax. This was achieved by debasing the currency. A debasement was an act by 
the monetary authority of lowering the silver content of the livre tournois, usually by 
issuing a new coin with the same face value, but with smaller content of silver. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1997) for the Ottoman Empire. 
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debasements generated inflation by increasing the nominal value of bullion, in a similar 
way to modern exchange rate devaluations. The debasements increased the demand for 
nominal money, which was met by increased money supply through minting of new 
silver bullion and of older coins and thus increased the crown’s seignorage revenues. 
Such periods of repeated debasements were very common during the hundred years war. 
During such episodes fineness fell to very low levels and many episodes ended in 
‘stabilizations,’ when the crown stopped the process and issued new coins of high 
fineness, which became the only legal tender. These episodes of debasements and 
stabilizations are the topic of this paper. 
 We next describe money creation. In ordinary times money supply was generated 
primarily through minting of private bullion. The monetary authority offered to 
exchange, at the ‘mint price’, any amount of bullion in return for royal coins. The mint 
price was the amount of coins minted from one unit of bullion net of seignorage and 
mint’s profits. Besides minting fresh bullion, the mint would also ‘remint’ older coins 
into new ones. In ordinary times people preferred not to remint old coins to avoid 
seignorage losses, unless the old coins were damaged. But there were two situations in 
which such exchange took place. The first one was following a debasement. Then, by 
reminting coins of high fineness into coins of lower fineness, but of the same face value, 
people could increase their money holdings, even after deduction of seignorage. Thus, 
debasements triggered much reminting. The second situation was stabilization, where 
people were forced to remint their old coins, as only the new coins were legal. To 
describe such an exchange, to coins with higher fineness, we use a different term, 
‘recoinage,’ since it involved a different technology. While regular reminting only 
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required adding cheap metal to coins, recoinage required extraction of silver from old 
coins to increase fineness and should have been more costly. Indeed we find historical 
evidence to such costs. For example, after the debasement cycles of 1353-4 and of 1360 
debased coins were purchased by mints at much lower prices than bullion of the same 
amount of silver. The difference in price was 10%-15%.4 
 Our description above of reminting during debasements implies that coins of 
various levels of fineness circulated together at the same face value. Reminting reduced 
the scope of this phenomenon, but as long as people did not remint all their old coins, 
there were still some types of coins in circulation. Could people distinguish between 
these different coins? The answer is no, since this information was costly. In order to find 
fineness one needed to assay the coins, which was an expert’s job. There is ample 
historical evidence on moneychangers in Medieval Europe, who specialized in coin 
evaluation and exchange. They were usually expert goldsmiths, either government agents 
or private entrepreneurs. “Changers manuals” were professional books, which described 
in detail the procedures for essaying and evaluating coins. Surviving archival documents, 
like changers account books, inform us about their operations. These accounts show that 
changers were fully aware of the debasement process since they catalogued, in detail, the 
coins from the various issues and determined their exchange rates. It is therefore 
plausible that changers were amongst the first to observe debasements of coinage and that 
they acted as middlemen between the public and the mint. 
 Costly information can explain both how different coins could circulate together 
on the one hand and how people could know which coins to remint on the other hand. If 
information is costly it is purchased only when the benefit is sufficiently high. Thus 
                                                 
4 See De Saulcy (1879), p. 352, 462. 
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individuals did not go to an expert before each transaction at the marketplace and hence 
coins circulated by tale in the goods markets. But people did go to an expert after a 
debasement to check which coins to remint. Indeed our historical data shows that the bulk 
of reminting usually took place during the first days after each debasement. 
 The main period of debasement explored in this paper is during the Hundred 
Years War. This war between England and France, which began in the 1330s and lasted 
with intervals until 1452, placed a heavy burden on government finance. The fiscal 
resources of the French monarchy were designed to cover its regular expenses. Financing 
a war required additional resources on a grand scale. The French crown resorted to 
seignorage revenues by debasing the royal coinage primarily because seignorage was part 
of the traditional feudal rights of the king. As such, the crown did not require the consent 
of the representative assemblies for levying this tax, while other taxes were always 
contested, hard to obtain and required extensive and lengthy bargaining to secure. 
Moreover, the collection costs involving seignorage revenues were small and the flow of 
funds to the treasury timely.  
 The extent of debasement depended on the (mis)fortunes of war and on the 
political bargaining power of the king. The Hundred Years War witnessed two periods of 
extensive debasements: 1337-1360 and 1418-1436. The first was associated with the 
outbreak of the war, the major French defeats at Crecy and Poitiers (when King Jean II 
was captured by the English and held for ransom) and the onset of the Black Death. The 
second period followed the defeat at Agincourt and the civil war between the Armagnac 
and Burgundian factions. 
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3. The Model 
Consider a small open economy in a discrete time framework. There is an aggregate 
consumption good in the economy. Each individual produces 1 unit of the consumption 
good during each period of time. We further assume that the individual cannot consume 
his own product but only production of others. Hence, each individual has to trade in 
order to consume. We further assume that trading takes place in small quantities and thus 
each individual trades many times during a single period of time. We assume that there 
are two assets in the economy, silver (in the form of bullion) and money (coins). Both 
silver and the consumption good are assumed to be internationally tradable, and thus have 
a fixed relative price, which is assumed to be 1. Silver can be traded over time as well. 
Lending and borrowing of silver is done in the world’s capital market at a world interest 
rate, which is assumed to be fixed and equal to r. The second asset is money, which 
comes in the form of coins, which contain silver. Money is non-traded internationally, but 
is the only legal tender within the economy. The price of silver and of the physical good 
in terms of money is Pt. 
 There is a continuum of size one of consumers with infinite life horizons. They 
derive utility from consumption and from money holdings, since they need this money to 
carry out their many transactions during the period. This model therefore follows the 
tradition of money in the utility function, which began with Sidrauski (1967), and has 
been recently adapted to an open economy in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch. 8). For the 
sake of simplicity consumers are assumed to be risk neutral.  Utility of individuals in time 
0 is: 
(1) ∑∞
=
− 





++=
0
)1(
t t
t
t
t
P
mvcU ρ , 
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where mt is the amount of money (coins) held by the individual at the beginning of period 
t and v is a standard concave utility function. For the sake of simplicity we assume that 
the subjective discount rate is equal to the world interest rate, i.e. ρ = r. 
 Money is issued by mints, which offer Qt coins for 1 unit of silver in period t. We 
call Qt the ‘mint price’. The fineness, namely the proportion of silver in coins issued in 
period t is ft. We assume that all coins have the same weight, and normalize it to be 1, 
namely the same weight as one unit of silver.5 The overall amount of coins that can be 
made of one unit of silver is 1/ft, but consumers who bring silver for minting get fewer 
coins, since the government extracts seignorage at a rate st. Hence: 
(2) )1(1 t
t
t sf
Q −= . 
In this paper we consider debasements, namely increases of Qt by government, through 
reduction of fineness. More precisely, we consider episodes of repeated debasements 
over a long period of time, during which the mint price rises continuously. 
 Mints issue new coins in exchange of bullion, and in exchange of old coins, by 
reminting during debasements, or by recoinage during stabilizations.  As discussed in 
Section 2, recoinage is more costly. We therefore assume that reminting is costless 
(except for seignorage), while recoinage costs x per one unit of extracted silver. 
 We next lay out the informational and timing assumptions of the model. Each 
period opens with an announcement of a debasement (or a stabilization). Then mints 
operate at the beginning of the period, while trade in goods, which requires money, takes 
place only later. We assume that all coins look alike for ordinary folks and cannot be 
distinguished without help of experts, who are called ‘money changers.’ Such help is 
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costly. To simplify things we assume the following cost structure: in each period an 
individual can obtain one evaluation of his coins for free, but additional evaluations are 
infinitely costly. As a result, an individual evaluates coins only once each period. As 
assumed above, many transactions take place during a single period and coins circulate 
many times, so that individuals cannot keep track of the coin composition of their money. 
Hence, the optimal strategy is to check their coins at the beginning of the period, to 
decide which coins to remint, which coins to turn into silver and which coins to keep in 
circulation. During the period, when goods are continuously traded, the set of coins 
changes and the initial information is lost, since all coins look alike. Hence, due to the 
law of large numbers, by the end of each period the composition of coins held by each 
individual is the same as the economy-wide composition. 
 The government imposes no taxes and finances its activity by seignorage only. In 
each period it sets both fineness ft and the seignorage rate st from minting new coins and 
uses the seignorage revenues to finance its expenditures. We assume that the government 
spends these revenues on imports rather than domestically. This assumption is made for 
tractability only, and the alternative assumption, that seignorage revenues are used 
domestically, would not change the main results of the model.6 Finally, if the government 
decides to stabilize the currency, it issues new coins with higher fineness. In other words, 
it reduces the mint price Q and fixes it at the new lower level thereafter. 
 We further assume that all markets are perfectly competitive and that expectations 
are rational. We first analyze debasements and inflation that continue forever, without 
any stabilization. In the next stage we add stabilizations to the analysis. The public 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Historically not all coins had the same weight. This is of course only a simplifying assumption. 
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anticipates stabilization at the end of the debasements process, but does not know its 
exact timing. 
 
4. Minting Decisions and the Supply of Money 
We begin the analysis of equilibrium dynamics by looking at the decisions made in the 
beginning of the period, after the consumer learns of the composition of his coins from 
the expert. First, the consumer mints silver into coins as long as the price of silver Pt is 
less than or equal to the mint price Qt. Second, the consumer remints all coins with 
sufficiently high fineness, such that reminting can increase the number of coins. 
Formally, the consumer remints all coins with fineness f such that 
(3) 1)1( ≥−= t
t
t sf
ffQ . 
Since fineness is non-increasing over time, namely  for every time u, only the 
older coins with higher fineness are reminted. Hence, for every t there is a former period 
τ(t)≤t, such that coins older than it are reminted and fτ
1−≤ uu ff
(t) is the highest fineness held. This 
threshold period is defined by: fτ(t) < 1/Qt and fτ(t)-1 ≥ 1/Qt. Finally, consumers can also 
turn coins into silver, if the value of extracted silver exceeds the number of coins used. 
Hence, silver is extracted from coins of fineness fu if 
(4) 
xf
P
u
t −≥ 1
11 . 
 The supply of money can therefore be described by a step function, as in Figure 1, 
which has the price on the vertical axis and the quantity of money Mt on the horizontal 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Historically, the crown used seignorage income for both domestic purchases and imports. Interestingly, it 
listed the silver value of its seignorage revenues in its accounts. 
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axis. The amount of money Mt,r is the historically given amount of coins from last period 
after reminting, but before bullion minting or silver extraction. This amount does not 
depend on the price Pt, since reminting does not depend on price, as shown by equation 
(3). The demand for money is the demand of consumers only, as the government imports 
only. The demand for money is proportional to the price level Pt and is presented in 
Figure 1 by a ray from the origin. The equilibrium, which determines both the 
equilibrium price level and the equilibrium quantity of money, is given by the 
intersection of the supply step function and the demand for money. The equilibrium price 
must, therefore, be within the following range: 
(5) )1(1
1
11
t
t
tt
t
s
f
QP
xf
−=≥≥− . 
Figure 1 presents three possible equilibria. If the demand for money is small, as in D’, 
coins are transformed to silver by extraction. If the demand for money is as in D, there is 
neither silver extraction nor silver minting and Mt=Mt,r. In both cases the price of silver 
exceeds the mint price Qt. If the demand for money is large, as in D’’, bullions are minted 
into coins and the price is equal to the mint price.  
 Consider next the effect of debasement on equilibrium. A debasement introduces 
a new coin with lower fineness. Hence it raises Qt and shifts some of the supply curve 
upward. If the new fineness is low enough, so that ft falls below fτ(t-1)(1-st), there is 
reminting, which shifts the whole supply curve to the right as well, as it makes the upper 
step in the supply curve wider. Hence, a debasement tends to raise the price. Clearly, 
there can be a debasement, which leaves the price unchanged, if there is no reminting and 
if the previous price exceeds the new mint price. But if debasements are repeated, they 
finally raise prices. Thus, repeated debasements cause inflation. 
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 When the authorities declare stabilization, all coins must be reminted and hence 
the supply of money becomes infinitely elastic at the new mint price Qt. As a result, the 
equilibrium price, in the case of stabilization, is equal to the mint price. 
 
5. Debasements and Inflation 
In this section we consider the case of repeated debasements at a fixed rate π. Assume 
that the monetary policy the government pursues is the following: the rate of seigniorage 
is fixed over time, namely st = s, and the government debases the currency every period 
at a fixed rate π.7 Formally: 
(6) π+== −
−
11
1 t
t
t
t
f
f
Q
Q
. 
If the rate of debasement is fixed, the number of coins in circulation is fixed and we 
denote it by T. Every period a new coin is introduced and the oldest coin is reminted, 
namely  for every t. T is the unique integer which satisfies the following 
inequalities, which are derived from (3): 
1)( +−= Tttτ
(7) 1)1()1(
1
1 1 <−+≤+
− sTππ . 
We next show that after a few debasements the price Pt becomes equal to the mint price 
Qt. To see this note that the monetary dynamics are: 
(8) , tt
T
ttt eQsNMM +−−++= − ]1)1()1[(~1 π
where is the amount of coins reminted in time t and etN
~
t is the amount of bullion minted 
into coins in t. Hence, if there is no minting of new bullion   )]1()1[(1 sMM
T
tt −+≤ − π
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and the term in brackets is smaller than 1+π according to (7). Hence, if there is no 
minting of new silver, the quantity of money grows at a rate lower than 1+π. This cannot 
last long and after a few debasements there must be minting of new silver. Note that 
silver is minted only if the equilibrium price equals the mint price, as shown in Figure 1, 
and hence: 
(9) , tt QP =
and this equality holds from then on. The intuition behind this result is simple. Since the 
government uses the silver it gets as seignorage outside the economy, it reduces the silver 
contents of coins continuously. Hence, consumers need to mint new bullion, which they 
would not have done had the price of silver exceeded the mint price.8 
 In the rest of the section we focus on the steady state equilibrium. As shown 
above the rate of inflation at the steady state is π and the price equals the mint price. 
There are two main cases. In the first there is more than one type of coins in circulation, 
i.e. T>1. In this case reminting is partial. In the second case the rate of inflation is so high 
that there is only one coin in circulation, i.e. T=1. In this case all former coins are 
reminted. 
5.1. Debasements with Partial Reminting 
We next describe the steady state distribution of coins when T is greater than 1.9 The 
quantity of coins of fineness ft-u for all 0 ≤ u ≤ T-1 is the quantity of coins minted in 
period t-u, and is equal to 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Historically, the debasement episodes consisted not only of reduction in fineness, but often of increased 
seignorage rates as well. In the theoretical part of the paper we treat inflation and seignorage rates as 
independent. We return to this issue in the empirical part of the paper in Section 8. 
8 We should stress here that if the government uses its seignorage revenues domestically the equilibrium 
price might not always equal to the mint price, but the main results of the model remain intact. 
9 It can be shown that the distribution of coins converges to this steady state distribution. 
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(10) uTtut MN
−
−− ++−+= )1()1(1 1 πππ
π . 
Note that this distribution of coins is economy-wide, but also holds for any individual by 
end of trading period, due to high circulation of coins. 
 The individual maximizes utility (1) with respect to the budget constraints. Let us 
denote the optimal value of utility by Vt. Due to stationarity, the optimal value depends 
only on the amounts of assets inherited from the past. Since the coin composition by the 
end of each period is the same for all individuals, due to the law of large numbers, only 
the overall amount of money matters. Hence: 
(11)  
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Hence, the Bellman equation is 
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The budget constraints are as follows. The amount of silver changes according to 
(13)  , 010 )1( erbb −+= −
where e0 is the amount of bullion minted. The consumer’s quantity of money changes 
through minting, reminting and through transactions. Hence: 
(14)  , 0000110 )1()1()1()1( ePcPswmmwm
T +−+−++−= −− π
where w is the share of coins of highest fineness, which are being reminted, and is equal 
according to (10) to 
(15)  
1)1( −+= Tw π
π . 
Substituting (13) and (14) into the Bellman equation (12) we get: 
 16 
(16) 
( )










++


+
+−++−+−+−+
=



−
−
−
−
−
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
01
1
1
1
,
1
1
)1()1(11)1(
max,
P
mbV
rP
mv
sww
P
m
P
mbrb
P
mbV
Tπ
. 
Hence, the first order conditions are: 
(17)  
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with respect to silver and: 
(18)  
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with respect to real balances. Shifting (16) one period ahead we can calculate the 
marginal optimal value with respect to silver and real balances: 
  V rb += 1  
and: 
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Hence the demand for money is determined by the following condition, which holds for 
any period t: 
(19)  
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Equation (19) describes the demand for money. The left hand side is the marginal 
utility from holding money, while the right hand side is the marginal cost of holding 
money. It is a weighted average of the loss due to inflation to the coins, which are not 
reminted, and a smaller loss for the coins that are to be reminted next period. Since the 
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demand for money is endogenous in this economy, equation (19) determines the steady 
state amount of real balances: . tt mM =
The equilibrium real balances therefore depend both on the rate of inflation and on 
the rate of seignorage. Furthermore, the number of coins in circulation T is an 
endogenous variable, which depends on these two variables as well. In order to find how 
real balances depend on π and s in the reduced form, consider the rate of debasements, at 
which the number of coins switches from T+1 to T. This rate is determined by: 
. At this rate the marginal costs of both types of coins are equal. At this 
rate of debasement equilibrium real balances are 
1)1()1( =−+ sTπ
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We, therefore, conclude that real balances depend negatively on the rate of inflation as 
long as more than one type of coins circulates. Interestingly, demand for money does not 
depend on seignorage. 
 While our theory predicts the equilibrium stock of money, our data from 
Medieval France consists of flows of minting. Luckily, our model enables us to easily 
calculate the flow of minting, which depends on the amount of money and on the 
distribution of coins. The amount of real minting N/P is: 
(21)  
t
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From this equation we see that inflation affects minting in three channels. First, the 
overall demand for money M/P falls with inflation. Second, higher inflation reduces the 
value of old coins more rapidly and that increases minting as shown in the first term in 
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the RHS of (21). This exerts a positive effect of inflation on minting. Third, higher 
inflation reduces the number of coin types in circulation T and that also affects minting 
positively. In order to consider the three effects together, consider again the rate of 
inflation at which the number of coins falls from T+1 to T. At this rate minting is 
(22)  
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Hence, inflation affects minting in two ways: positively by reducing the number of types 
of coins in circulation and negatively by reducing the demand for money. The overall 
effect depends on the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to π. In our 
empirical analysis we test for the effect of inflation on the amount of real minting. If the 
effect we find is negative, it clearly shows that real balances are negatively related to the 
rate of inflation.  
5.2. Debasements with Full Reminting 
We next turn to the case where inflation is so high, that all old coins are reminted and 
there is only one coin in circulation, i.e. T=1. This case holds when 
(23)  . 1)1)(1( >−+ sπ
Solution of the optimal utility is similar to that in section 5.1, though simpler, since all 
coins are reminted and w=1. In this case the equilibrium amount of money is given by: 
(24)  
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Hence, the demand for money at a high rate of debasements does not depend on the rate 
of inflation but on the rate of seignorage only. 
This is a very surprising result, and it is unique for inflation in commodity money. 
More precisely, it is a result of the intrinsic value of coins, namely of their silver content, 
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in addition to their transaction value. When inflation is high, holders of commodity 
money can avoid the inflation tax by reminting. In doing so they reduce their losses to 
seignorage only. As a result their demand becomes insensitive to the inflation rate. 
 The rate of inflation at which individuals begin to remint all their coins and at 
which the demand for money depends only on the rate of seignorage only is 
(25)  
s
s
−= 1*π . 
When inflation exceeds π* and full reminting prevails, the real amount of minting is 
equal to real balances, since all coins are new. Hence, at rates of inflation above π* the 
amount of minting also depends on seignorage only and not on the rate of inflation. 
 
6. Debasements and Stabilization 
In section 5 we describe a debasement process that goes on forever. While this is a 
helpful simplification, it is not very realistic. Rulers could not debase their currency 
forever by bringing fineness as close as possible to zero, since at very low levels fineness 
becomes practically indistinguishable from zero and commodity money loses its value. 
Indeed, our historical records show that periods of repeated debasement, which reduced 
fineness to very low levels, ended in stabilizations. Since such stabilization was 
anticipated it affected the demand for money. This effect is the topic of this section. As in 
Section 5 we assume that there is a fixed rate of debasement π and a fixed rate of 
seignorage s. We further assume that the rate of debasement is high so that agents remint 
all coins every period. Let zt denote the probability in period t that stabilization occurs 
next period. Later on, we make this probability endogenous as well. 
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 Before solving the model we show that in this case the price is equal to the mint 
price as well, if the rate of seignorage is sufficiently high. Note that if there is no minting 
of new bullion, money supply grows by a rate , which is much lower than 
the rate of debasement π. Hence, even if the demand for real balances falls as 
stabilization becomes more anticipated, it cannot decline to zero. We therefore conclude 
that there is minting of new bullion and the equilibrium price equals the mint price.
1)1)(1( −−+ sπ
10 
Hence, the rate of inflation is equal to π. 
 We solve the model recursively, first calculating optimal utility from stabilization 
on, and then calculating optimal utility before stabilization, during the debasement 
process. If stabilization occurs in period t, optimal utility V  depends on the accumulated 
amounts of silver and real balances, and is equal to 
S
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where l* is the amount of real balances after stabilization, which is determined by 
r
rlv +=′ 1*)( . 
 Next denote by V the optimal value of utility prior to stabilization in period t. The 
Bellman equation is 
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under the constraint: 
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10 Note that even if the price is higher than the mint price the qualitative results of the model remain intact. 
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Before we derive the first order conditions, note that due to the envelope theorem, the 
partial derivatives of V are 
ss
P
PVrV
t
t
mb −=−+=+= − 1)1)(1(and1 1 π . 
The first order condition of the Bellman equation with respect to silver b is therefore 
redundant. The first order condition with respect to money is: 
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Hence, the demand for money depends both on the rate of seignorage and on the 
probability of stabilization. This probability has a negative effect on the demand for 
money. Note that this effect depends on x being positive, namely it depends on the cost of 
silver extraction being positive. Hence, the probability of stabilization has a negative 
effect on the demand for money since agents wish to minimize the cost of recoinage, of 
converting debased coins into good coins. 
 We next try to describe how the probability of stabilization evolves over time, 
using a Bayesian learning process under very simple assumptions. Assume that the public 
only knows that the process of debasement cannot go on to zero fineness, and there is a 
minimum level of fineness f*. Hence, if the economy is expected to reach this fineness in 
period T*, and there has been no stabilization until t, the probability of stabilization is 
uniform, and is equal to 
(30)  
tT
zt −= *
1 . 
Fineness falls at a rate π, and hence T* can be deduced from 
                                                                                                                                                 
This is therefore only a simplifying assumption. 
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We therefore get that the probability of stabilization is 
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The probability of stabilization, therefore, depends negatively on fineness. The lower 
fineness is, the higher is the probability that the process of debasements ends soon. This 
probability also depends positively on the rate of debasement. 
 Finally note that since only one coin circulates, the amount of minting is equal to 
the amount of money: Nt = Mt = mt. Hence, minting depends negatively on the rate of 
seignorage and negatively on the probability of stabilization. As debasement continues, 
anticipation of stabilization rises, and hence minting is reduced. This is also an 
explanation to the puzzle raised by Rolnick, Velde and Weber (1996), who find the 
amount of minting to be too small given the rates of inflation in such situations. 
 
7. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper is derived from original mint accounts found in the national 
French archives and in the regional archive of the Isere at Grenoble.11 Periodical mint 
accounts were submitted to the central monetary administration in Paris. They contain 
information on the type and quantity of coins minted, on costs, seignorage revenues and 
net profits of mint. Due to losses, fires and wars the extent of coverage of these 
documents is incomplete, but we were able to assemble a data set that covers the main 
periods of debasements during the 1350s and in 1415-1422 from 12 mints of varying 
importance and location. The full list of mints and dates of accounts is in the Appendix. 
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 It is important to note that the data does not come in fixed periods of time but 
rather in periods with varying lengths, since the frequency of submitting mint accounts to 
the auditors in Paris was not uniform. The accounts’ lengths vary from one day to fifteen 
months, the average length being one month. Accounts’ lengths varied both across mints 
and over time. Under normal circumstances accounts were submitted annually or semi-
annually. However, during debasements, they were submitted more frequently. This is 
due to tighter control over mints in such periods, and also because mints had to submit 
accounts following changes in any of the characteristics of the coinage. During 
debasement these changes were more frequent. A further complication arises from the 
fact that royal orders reached mints with varying delays, due to distances between mints 
and Paris, due to difficulty of travel in war zones and due to necessity to sometimes pass 
through provincial administrative centers. 
 Although the data are in varying lengths of time, they cover continuous periods of 
time for the 12 mints and enable us to calculate the main variables and how they evolve 
over time. The data are pooled and allow us to test our two main hypotheses. The relevant 
variables are mint prices, from which we derive rates of debasements or rates of inflation, 
seignorage rates, and amounts of minting. Data on amounts of minting are in units of 
silver minted. It is equal to real minting in the model, since: 
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The right hand side is the amount of silver minted (including seignorage), which is 
reported in the accounts. As for the inflation variable, we have calculated two inflation 
rates. One is a rate of inflation for each account, namely the rate of change since last 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 For greater detail see Sussman (1997). 
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debasement compounded to annual terms. In our regressions we use an annual rate of 
inflation calculated as the rate of change of the mint price in a year at a representative 
mint. These are Rouen for the 1337-1361 period, and Romans for the 1400-1423 period.    
 We first present some description of French debasements in the years 1330-1436. 
The first debasement period was characterized by repeated cycles of debasement and 
stabilizations. The period from 1337 to 1354 witnessed 34 mild debasement cycles with 
relatively long periods of stable money (Figure 2). The period from 1354 to 1360 saw 51 
rapid debasement cycles that reached hyperinflationary magnitudes in 1360 (figure 3). 
The average rise in the nominal value of silver during such a cycle was 200% and the 
average duration of a debasement cycle was 400 days.  The largest debasement cycle 
increased silver price by 600% and lasted only 116 days. The smallest cycle increased 
price by 66%. The shortest debasement cycle was 33 days during which the nominal 
value of silver increased by 100%. The period from 1417 to 1422 was characterized by a 
prolonged process of debasement during which the nominal value of silver was increased 
by 3500% without any attempt to stabilize the currency (figure 4). Milder debasements 
(average of 80% per cycle) followed until 1436 (figure 5).  
 The debasements resulted in substantial minting and large government revenues. 
While complete data for all the mints operating in France is lacking, our data allows us to 
assess the quantitative aspects of these episodes. Figure 6 shows mint outputs of four 
major French mints. Total mint output for the four mints in 1355 was about 75,000 marcs 
of pure silver (20 tons) while the annual average of total minting in France in non-
debasement years was 5,000 marcs. The revenues of government were also impressive: 
according to Maurice Rey, the 1419 seignorage revenues amounted to six times ordinary 
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royal revenues. Figures 7, 8 and 9 show, respectively, minting levels and seignorage 
revenues at the mints of Rouen and Montpelier and the Dauphine mints (Cremieu, 
Mirabel and Romans). The figures illustrate the high share of seignorage revenues out of 
total minting. It is interesting to compare Rouen (Figure 7) and Montpelier (Figure 8). In 
1356, following the capture of King Jean by the English at Poitiers, the Estates of 
Languedoc (southern France) voted to suspend debasement whereas the mints of the 
North continued to debase the currency. In response, mint outputs and seignorage 
revenues in Montpelier started to decline, while at Rouen they reached an all time high. 
 In the theoretical section of the paper we identify the price of silver with 
commodity price and thus the rate of inflation becomes equal to the rate of debasement. 
We next show some supportive evidence. While high quality price data for France are 
lacking, nevertheless, Table 1 reproduces data from Sussman (1993) for the Dauphine, 
which shows that grain prices followed the course of mint prices whereas the price of 
gold followed the price of silver. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
8. Empirical Analysis 
Our model describes how the demand for commodity money is related to three main 
variables: the rate of inflation, the rate of seignorage and the anticipated probability of 
stabilization. For lack of data on quantity of money we use data on mint outputs instead 
to test the two main conclusions of the model. The first is that the demand for money falls 
with inflation up to some level and above it becomes insensitive to the rate of inflation. 
The second is that anticipation of stabilization reduces the demand for money. 
 26 
 Before we describe the empirical analysis we address three important issues. The 
first is related to the correlation between the seignorage rate and the rate of inflation. 
While the model treats the two variables as independent, historically they tended to rise 
together, in times of tight fiscal conditions. But as our data shows, the correlation 
between the rates of debasement and of seignorage is positive but not so high, and the 
correlations for all mints are less than 0.5. Hence, we treat these variables, inflation and 
seignorage, as independent explanatory variables in our regression analysis. 
The second empirical issue is that lengths of mint accounts varied significantly, as 
described above. The dependent variable we use is the overall amount of minting in the 
account period, instead of minting per unit of time, and we add the length of the account 
period to the explanatory variables. This procedure reflects what we learn from the 
records, namely that most minting activity was concentrated in the beginning of each 
period, following the debasement. In any case, we check and find that using quantities of 
minting per unit of time does not change the results by much. 
The third and main issue is how to distinguish between the direct and the indirect 
effect of inflation on the demand for money, where the indirect effect is through the 
anticipated probability of stabilization, as shown in equation (31). We deal with this issue 
in two ways. First, we estimate the effect of inflation on the demand for money during 
periods, which are relatively far from stabilizations, so that the indirect effect through 
anticipation of stabilization is negligible. Second, we estimate the probability of 
stabilization and then estimate both the direct effect of the rate of inflation and the effect 
of the probability of stabilization on minting. 
We begin our empirical analysis with estimations of a basic equation, of mint 
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output as a function of the rate of inflation, the rate of seignorage and the length of 
account period, excluding for the meanwhile the probability of stabilization. These 
estimations are presented in Table 2. According to Regression I the rate of seignorage has 
a negative effect on the amount of minting and the inflation rate too has a negative effect 
on minting. Note, that our model predicts that inflation has a negative effect on the 
demand for money, but its effect on minting is unclear, as at a higher rate of inflation 
fewer coin types circulate and a larger proportion of coins is reminted. According to 
Regression I the overall effect in our historical episodes was negative. That clearly shows 
that the effect of inflation on the demand for money was negative, which is the first main 
result of our model. Finally, the effect of time length of account is very significantly 
positive, as expected, but the elasticity is smaller than 1, slightly above 0.5. We interpret 
it as a result of the concentration of minting at the beginning of the period. It cannot be a 
result of potential negative correlation between length of account period and inflation, 
since that should increase measured elasticity to above 1. Regression II in Table 2 is the 
same equation as Regression I only with fixed effects for mints. The results are fairly 
similar to those of regression I.12 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Regressions III-VI in Table 2 examine whether the effect of inflation differs under 
low and high inflation rates.13 According to equation (25) the threshold rate of inflation 
between partial and full reminting is equal to π* = s/(1-s). The rate of seignorage was not 
fixed during the period we describe, and rose with inflation.  Since on average it was 
                                                 
12 Random Effect versions to all regressions in Table 2 yield very similar results. 
13 For selecting sub-samples we use the inflation rate for each individual mint account. The inflation 
variable in the regression is the annual rate common to all mints. See Section 7 for precise definitions. 
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around 1/3, the threshold rate of inflation should be about 50%.14 Regressions III and IV 
in Table 2 show that the effect of inflation is much larger and more significant when 
inflation is below 50%. However, at high rates of inflation the probability of stabilization 
becomes higher, which might add an indirect effect to inflation on the demand for money. 
To reduce this indirect effect Regressions V and VI are limited to periods far from 
stabilization, namely at least 120 days before any stabilization. These regressions fully 
confirm our main hypothesis: the rate of inflation has a large negative effect on the 
demand for money in Regression V, where inflation is below 50%, while in Regression 
VI, when inflation is above 50% and reminting is full, it has no effect on the demand for 
money. 
Next we estimate a measure of the expected probability of stabilization and add it 
as a fourth explanatory variable to the minting equation. This probability is estimated in 
the following method. In every period t we know the actual duration until stabilization, 
i.e. t − t , where t  is the actual date of stabilization. Expected duration until stabilization 
is equal to (T*-t)/2 under the assumption of uniform distribution, but it is also equal to the 
expectation of t . Hence, we can write: t−
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We therefore estimate a regression of the actual time to stabilization on two explanatory 
variables: the logarithms of fineness and of the rate of inflation. This regression is 
presented in Table 3 and it indeed shows that the expected time to stabilization decreases 
with inflation and increases with fineness. The probability of stabilization is exactly equal 
                                                 
14 When inflation was low the average seignorage rate was 27%, while at high rates of inflation the 
seignorage rate was 37% on average and even reached a maximum of 75%! 
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to 1 over the expected time to stabilization. Therefore, the probability of stabilization 
rises with inflation and is negatively related to fineness. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 We next add the probability of stabilization as an explanatory variable in the 
minting equation. In this estimation we try to examine together our two hypotheses, 
namely that the demand for money reacts differently to high and low inflation and that it 
is negatively related to the probability of stabilization. Table 4 presents three regressions, 
with log of mint output as the dependent variable, and inflation, seigniorage, length of 
account and the probability of stabilization are the dependent variables. All regressions 
control for mints fixed effects. Regression I replicates the main results presented above: 
the seignorage rate and inflation have negative effects on minting, while the length of the 
period of account has a positive effect with elasticity less than 1. The new result is that 
the probability of stabilization has a significantly negative effect on minting, namely on 
the demand for money. The next two regressions in Table 4 deal separately with periods 
of inflation below and above 50%. While the effect of inflation becomes stronger and 
more significant at low rates of inflation, its effect at high rates of inflation is zero. 
Another interesting result is that the probability of stabilization becomes insignificant at 
low rates of inflation. This result is fairly reasonable, as at low inflation the probability of 
stabilization should be low. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The regressions in Table 4 therefore give further support to the two main 
hypotheses of our model, that at high rates of inflation the demand for money becomes 
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insensitive to inflation, and that the probability of stabilization has a significant negative 
effect on the demand for money, beyond the effects of seignorage and inflation. 
 At this point, we briefly return to the assumption that coins cannot be 
distinguished by fineness, namely that coins are traded by tale and not by weight. If 
indeed people have full information on the silver content of coins, then debasements 
would not affect consumer behavior in our model. Consumers would use mostly the old 
coins and there will be little demand for the new coins. As a result the amounts of 
minting would be zero (or close to zero). Clearly, we will not observe a negative 
relationship between the rate of debasement and minting. Thus, the results of our 
empirical analysis provide support to our basic assumption that coins circulated by tale 
and not by weight. 
 
9. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we show how inflation and even high inflation happen under a commodity 
money regime. The possibility of high inflation due to debasements is shown in theory 
and then demonstrated by hundred years of frequent debasements in medieval France. 
Hence, a commodity money regime is quite similar to the more modern fiat money 
regime in its ability to generate inflation tax. 
Despite this basic similarity between commodity and fiat money, we observe two 
main differences between the two regimes. First, under commodity money the demand 
for money falls less at high rates of inflation, because coins still retain some intrinsic 
alternative value and can be used for reminting. The second difference between the two 
regimes is the effect of stabilization anticipations. While under fiat money such 
 31 
anticipations usually increase the demand for money, under commodity money they have 
an opposite effect. 
We test for these two results using minting data found in French archives and we 
find strong evidence in their support. We show that minting declines with inflation at low 
rates and that shows that demand for money is indeed negatively related to inflation at 
low rates. We also show that minting becomes insensitive to inflation at high rates, and 
that holds for demand for money as well. Finally, we show that minting declines with the 
probability of stabilization. 
Our model, findings and conclusions are not limited to France during the Hundred 
Years War. There were numerous periods of debasements in Europe in the early modern 
period, in the Low Countries, Spain, England, in Italian city-states, in Germany and in the 
Ottoman Empire. Though French data are perhaps the most extensive and of the highest 
quality, we believe that our approach can be used to explain similar episodes in other 
countries and over a large period of time. 
In this paper we assume that agents demand royal coins and trade them at face 
value. It could be interesting to question the origins of this very assumption itself. Is it 
due to the public good aspect of royal coinage? Are there economies of scale in their use? 
Why do people use coins at face value even when inflation is very high and seignorage 
rate is high as well? These are questions, which we do not address here, but they are 
raised by our story and they are relevant for understanding the role of money not only in 
the past but in the present as well. 
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 Appendix 
This appendix lists the mints and the periods of time for each mint for which we have 
minting accounts: 
1. Chaumont:   March 5, 1360 – December 18, 1360. 
2. Cremieu:   July 14, 1389 – December 23, 1422. 
3. La Rochelle:  January 18, 1360 – May 28, 1361. 
4. Mirabel:   April 5, 1405 – September 19, 1422. 
5. Montpelier:  June 27, 1351 – August 26, 1351; 
 July 8, 1354 – December 16, 1384; 
 February 10, 1404 – June 24, 1417. 
6. Poitier:   March 13, 1354 – March 3, 1361. 
7. Romans:   February 1, 1402 – October 7, 1422. 
8. Rouen:   October 7, 1354 – May 20, 1362. 
9. St. Lo:    July 1, 1360 – March 11, 1362; 
   February 6, 1397 – July 30, 1404. 
10. St. Pourcain:  April 14, 1354 – August 8, 1361. 
11. Toulouse:   December 7, 1353 – August 5, 1361; 
 May 12, 1365 – December 19, 1384; 
 November 15, 1404 – April 2, 1423. 
12. Troyes:   December 7, 1354 – April 22, 1405; 
   February 3, 1412 – April 28, 1419. 
 
 35 
 Tables 
 
Table 1 
Annual Price Changes In The Dauphine, 1418-1422 
  Silver:  Gold: Grain: 
Year  Mint Par Mint Price Gold Price Wheat Price 
      
1418   50% 13% 22% 50% 
1419   33% 56% 45% 40% 
1420   50% 43% 88% -40% 
1421   167% 75% 100% 100% 
1422   200% 100% 233% 200% 
      
Cumulative:  2300% 775% 2122% 656% 
 
Source: Sussman (1993) 
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 Table 2 
Effects of Inflation and Seignorage on Minting 
Dependent Variable Log(Mint Output) 
Regression I II III IV V VI 
Inflation   <50% >50% <50% >50% 
Days to Stabilization     >120 >120 
Method  Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Constant 5.50 
(22.68) 
     
Seignorage Rate -1.01 
(-3.58) 
-0.77 
(-2.53) 
-0.47 
(-1.11) 
-1.40 
(-2.55) 
-0.44 
(-0.75) 
-2.31 
(-2.88) 
Inflation Rate -0.17 
(-2.27) 
-0.28 
(-3.70) 
-0.36 
(-3.19) 
-0.22 
(-2.13) 
-0.40 
(-2.68) 
-0.08 
(-0.49) 
Log (Length of 
Account Period)  
0.52 
(13.76) 
0.57 
(15.66) 
0.55 
(9.77) 
0.61 
11.58 
0.53 
(7.15) 
0.71 
(9.17) 
R2 0.70 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.48 
D.W. 1.38 1.62 2.08 1.29 2.17 1.29 
No. of Observations 539 539 248 278 159 150 
Notes: 
• t-values in parenthesis 
• All regressions estimated using GLS procedure. 
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Table 3 
The Expected Probability of Stabilization 
Dependent Variable Number of days to 
stabilization 
Method Fixed effects 
Log(Inflation Rate) -85.26 
(-3.78) 
Log(Fineness) 238.55 
(10.65) 
R2 0.47 
D.W. 0.4553 
No. of Observations 506 
 
Notes: 
• t-values in parenthesis 
• Regression is estimated using GLS procedure with cross section weights. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Inflation and Probability of Stabilization: Fixed Effects Regressions 
Dependent variable Log(Mint Output During Period) 
Regression I II 
Inflation < 50% 
III 
Inflation > 50% 
Seignorage rate -0.72 
(-2.11) 
-0.43 
(-0.85) 
-1.09 
(-1.95) 
Inflation -0.26 
(-3.13) 
-0.44 
(-3.75) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
Log(Probability of 
Stabilization) 
-0.18 
(-2.20) 
-0.1 
(-0.59) 
-0.37 
(-3.31) 
Log(Length of Account 
Period) 
0.57 
(15.10) 
0.55 
(9.40) 
0.64 
(12.66) 
R2 0.67 0.49 0.49 
D.W. 1.74 2.04 1.30 
No. of Observations 488 225 256 
 
Notes:   
• t-values in parenthesis 
• All Regressions estimated using GLS procedure with cross section weights. 
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 Figure 2 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 6 
 
0 
5000 
10000 
15000 
20000 
25000 
30000 
1350 1352 1354 1356 1358 1360 







  



















































































































































































































 Montpellier

 Toulouse

 Troyes

Rouen
Minting volumes: France 1350-1361
in marcs of pure silver
Figure 7 
0 
5000 
10000 
15000 
20000 
25000 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 
Marcs minted Mint Price -livres
net revenues in pure silver
Debasement Minting
Rouen: 1354-1361
 43 
Figure 8 
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